AN

ESSAY

ON

INVASIONS AND DEFENCE

OF

THE COASTS;

WITH

SHORT TRACTS

ON

VARIOUS TEMPORARY SUBJECTS;

PARTICULARLY A REVIEW OF

THE KING OF PRUSSIA'S CONDUCT.

By JOSEPH WILLIAMS, Esq.

DEDICATED TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

GENERAL SIR WILLIAM AUGUSTUS PITT, K.B.

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1797.

BRITISH MUSEUM

TO

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

GENERAL SIR WILLIAM AUGUSTUS PITT, K. B.

TO wear out the heavy hours of grievous oppreſſion, I have wrote the following pages.—Having ſerved part of my ſoldierſhip under your command, and having experienced many civilities from you, I am led from gratitude and inclination to wiſh the ſanction of your name—to offer my thoughts in theſe few ſheets to the Public.

No

No great judgment can be formed of a ſoldier's capacity in the common rote of parade duty—you know me in no other ſituation.

Whatever my abilities may have been, they have been loſt in the labyrinth of miſrepreſentation and injuſtice. As the hiſtory of my life is a compleat hiſtory of grievances, it would avail little to the Public, or to myſelf, to dwell on ſuch a diſagreeable ſubject. Notwithſtanding ſuch a world of wrongs I have to complain of, they have never warped my attachment to my country, nor the

principles

principles I firſt imbibed from my family and education, which I have endeavoured by this and ſeveral other publications to give proofs of.

That the informations contained in this ſmall pamphlet may meet with your approbation, is the ſincere wiſh of

Your moſt obedient

And moſt obliged

Humble Servant,

JOSEPH WILLIAMS.

CLEVELAND-ROW,
Feb. 18*th*, 1797.

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BRITISH MUSEUM

ERRATA.

Page 11, line ſecond, leave out the word *many*.

Page 42, fourth line, *for* ex actis verbis diurnis, *read* ex actis urbis diurnis.

INVASION.

THE alarm of an Invaſion from France has led me to conſider, Firſt, the probability of ſuch an event, and next the conſequence; to draw inferences from paſt attempts by what has been done, and, comparing the ſituation of ſuch times with the preſent, to judge of what may be done, as much as the viciſſitudes and chances of war can admit.

The firſt invaſion of this country which hiſtory or tradition has handed down to us, is that of Cæſar's, and we have no other account of that tranſaction but his own, in what is called his Commentaries—a wonderful performance, conſidering its antiquity and the ſoldierly ſtyle, although critics have charged it with want of candour and accuracy.

Cæſar reſolved on that expedition to puniſh the Brittains for their continual ſupplies to

the Gauls: what theſe ſupplies were he does not point out, which is to be regretted; as if he had, it would have thrown a conſiderable light on the Hiſtory of the Brittains in that early period; and what appears extraordinary, neither the Gauls nor merchants who trafficked with the Brittains could give any account of them.

Cæſar ſent Voluſenus in a galley to make diſcoveries, who returned in five days without having landed on the iſland; having, I ſuppoſe, only diſcovered the ports of Dover and Deal, being the neareſt and only ports in the coaſts oppoſite Calais where he could anchor his fleet, and debark his army.

Cæſar embarked two legions, in eighty veſſels of burden, at the port of Iccius, (Calais) leaving eighteen ſhips in an harbour eight miles diſtant to follow him with the cavalry. Cæſar hints that he had gallies that carried engines, ſlingers, and archers.

The two legions, I conceive, conſiſted of ten thouſand men, and I conſider the auxiliaries generally equalled the legions in numbers, and were in ſome ſort attendants upon them, for Cæſar in ſome of his wars in Gaul obſerves,

obſerves, that a buſhel of corn was allowed a ſoldier and his ſervant per week. Tacitus does not elucidate this matter; the diſcipline and manners of the Romans muſt have ſuffered great alterations in the courſe of an hundred years, the diſtance of time between Cæſar's Commentaries and the Hiſtory of Tacitus.

Cæſar, with a fair wind, ſailed in the third watch, (after twelve at night.) He arrived on the Engliſh coaſt about the fourth hour of the day, (ten o'clock the next morning) under the cliffs of Dover: there Cæſar found the Brittains ready to receive him; but deeming the advantage of the cliffs too much in favour of the defendants, he ſailed a little clear of thoſe cliffs, and debarked in the face of the Brittains near Deal; with ſome difficulty he made good his landing. He found that his legionary ſoldiers in armour were an overmatch for the naked Brittains; notwithſtanding all he could do was to make good his poſition, and defend himſelf againſt the frequent attacks of the Brittains.—Diſappointed of his cavalry, Cæſar could make no excurſion, nor could he ſend out a foraging

party without a whole legion to protect them. Diſappointed of his reinforcement and reſources, he muſt have found that his army could not have exiſted: he reimbarked his troops in the night, and returned to the Continent. Cæſar muſt have landed in July, (harveſt time) and returned in September before the Æquinox.

Cæſar's Second Invaſion.

CÆSAR's ſecond invaſion was of a more ſerious nature, a whole winter and the entire exertion of the Roman power being engaged in a preparation to ſubdue this iſland: five legions, with two thouſand horſe, were embarked in a fleet of nine hundred ſail, that muſt have contained an equal number of auxiliaries and ſtores for at leaſt ſix months.

The year before, Cæſar ſet ſail after midnight, but on this ſecond expedition at ſunſet, hoping to arrive on the Engliſh coaſt at day-light, knowing that the courſe of the day

day was required to debark ſuch an army, and to fortify a camp to ſecure them when landed; from this I am perſuaded that any future invaſion will aſſail the coaſt at day-light, which will give them a day of ſixteen hours, from four in the morning until nine at night, to make a landing: there are many that ſuppoſe an invaſion would debark in the night, but every reaſon, beſides this evidence of Cæſar, contradicts ſuch an idea.

A north-weſt wind kept Cæſar in port three weeks; this I can eaſily conceive, having been kept at Holyhead twenty-one days, by a north-weſt wind, from ſailing to Dublin, though ſeveral attempts had been made to turn out of harbour.—Cæſar at laſt ſailed with a gentle ſouth wind, which during the night died away, when his fleet was carried to the north-eaſt, ſo as to leave England on the left hand; the tide urging them along, Cæſar overſhot his port, where the Brittains were waiting for him; they, perceiving this immenſe fleet paſs by the Thames, ſuſpected that Cæſar meant to land in Eſſex or Norfolk; therefore the Brittains marched off to meet him there, by which they

they loſt ſight of the fleet. In the mean time the tide turning, and, as Cæſar ſays, by the exertion of their oars, he returned to the old place in Kent, and landed without oppoſition.

The above is a leſſon to ſhew how far the wind and tide can counteract the beſt-plotted deſign. In reſpect to military judgment and deſign as a General, Cæſar never had a ſuperior.

The conſequence of this invaſion proves that Cæſar found the conqueſt of Brittain too arduous an undertaking: after having fought many battles, taken their capital, Verulam (St. Alban's), he returned to his camp at Barham Downs, repaired his fleet that had been much damaged by ſtorms—he returned before the autumnal Æquinox.

Cæſar's Commentaries, eſpecially that part appertaining to Britain, are conſidered, by critics, to be deficient in candour and accuracy; yet there are many incidents to inſtruct our commanders in the many difficulties that muſt occur, even where no fleet oppoſes an invaſion, in a country prepared to receive them, equal in arms, diſcipline, and courage,

and

and ſuperior in reſources. The reception the Spaniards met with at Gibraltar is a ſufficient proof what they muſt expect but deſtruction if they landed in this country, where Engliſhmen would fight *pro aris et focis.*

William Duke of Normandy,

BETTER KNOWN BY THE TITLE OF

WILLIAM THE CONQUEROR.

AFTER Cæſar's departure the Brittains were unmoleſted by the Romans ninety years, until the time of Claudius, who invaded Brittain, and made it a Roman province: having no circumſtantial account of this invaſion, makes Cæſar's Commentaries the more valuable relict of antiquity.—Brittain remained under the ſubjection of Rome, as a province, four hundred and ſixty years. When the Romans quitted this country, the Scots made inroads into Brittain. The Saxons and Danes were called in by different

rent parties, and the coaſts were continually infeſted by pirates, and country torn in pieces by internal diviſions for five hundred years, until William Duke of Normandy conveyed an immenſe army, with a fleet of nine hundred ſail, and landed at Peverſey in Suſſex without oppoſition. The thing of greateſt remark is, that one battle decided the fate of the kingdom.—I do not conſider William's deſcent as an invaſion—it was to contend for the crown; to which he laid claim, and to which he was invited.

Edward the Second's queen, and Henry the Seventh, made their deſcents, landed with foreign troops, and likewiſe ſucceeded; when Harold was engaged with the King of Denmark near York, who had debarked an army at the Humber, William landed; which Harold hearing, after he had gained a victory over the Danes at Battle-Bridge on the twenty-fifth of September, haſtens with his army, and engages William at Battle Abbey, on the fourteenth of October, which is almoſt incredible: allowing two days after his victory on the twenty-fifth, and two days to arrange his army, he muſt have marched an army fifteen

fifteen miles a day, for fourteen days together, without a halting day.

After Harold's death, the Clergy and City of London, having the greateſt ſtakes, wiſely ſend to Duke William, and tender the crown: that being what William wanted, terminates the iſſue. William, however, fortifies Dover, to ſecure his retreat—a precaution the French would embrace if they landed.

Spaniſh Armada

WAS the only real preparation, the ſecond expedition of Cæſar excepted, for making a conqueſt of this kingdom.—Phillip the Second had the ſame ambitious views as the French have at this time of ſubjugating, and giving laws to Europe; but he found himſelf continually thwarted in his projects by the ſecret intrigues and aſſiſtance that Elizabeth afforded his enemies: he therefore formed a reſolution to invade England ten years before the execution: notwithſtanding the ſpecious colour of peace, under

various pretences, he was indefatigable in forming a fleet, and this armament. Three years before the execution, the Spaniards commenced hoſtilities, and the purport of their preparation was avowed to invade England. Phillip having obtained the acquiſition of Portugal, enabled him to form a fleet much ſuperior to any naval armament that Elizabeth could collect to oppoſe it.

So certain the Spaniards were of ſucceſs, that they called it the Invincible Armada, in which were embarked twenty thouſand men; twenty thouſand were ready on the coaſt of France: the Prince of Parma had likewiſe thirty thouſand at Dunkirk, and at Oſtend. This Armada had an immenſe number of ſpare arms, had one hundred and eighty eccleſiaſtics, which ſhews that the reformation was not ſufficiently eſtabliſhed, but that the Catholics were expected to join the Spaniards on their landing, which no doubt they would have done, notwithſtanding their declaratory addreſſes to the Queen of their attachment to her government.

The fate of the Armada is in every body's knowledge, we are therefrom to draw many inferences from it: our navy had time to prepare itſelf to its fulleſt energy, our internal defence had ſufficient time to be ſo diſpoſed as to receive the enemy, the Queen knew the intention of the enemy to land as near the Thames as poſſible, and their ſhips of war were to anchor in the Downs to give every aſſiſtance.

To guard the city, twenty thouſand men were encamped at Tilbury in Eſſex, twenty thouſand in the ſouth of England, and the Queen had thirty-five thouſand with the Royal Standard. It is to be regretted, that a more circumſtantial account of the mode of diſpoſition has not been handed down to us, more particularly as printing had arrived at that time to ſome perfection, an advantage that Cæſar or William the Conqueror had not.

The ſame inconveniency attended the Spaniards which Cæſar found in his firſt expedition, and corrected in his ſecond, namely, that no reliance could be put in an embarkation in a different port from the main en-

terpriſe, by which Cæſar loſt the aſſiſtance of his cavalry, as the Spaniards did of the Prince of Parma: there are many inſtances of failure when depending on different embarkations.

Diſpoſition and Mode of Defence.

HAVING given a ſhort account of Cæſar's Invaſion, as well as the Spaniſh Armada, and likewiſe the Duke of Normandy's deſcent, which I diſtinguiſh from that of an invaſion, depending, I am perſuaded, more in a party to ſupport his claim to the crown, than an idea of ſubjugating this iſland as a province to Normandy, with an army he brought with him, which could expect no reinforcement, having burnt their fleet.

I will conſider an invaſion of this country under two diſtinct appellations, viz. an Home Invaſion, and a Foreign Invaſion.

The firſt is meant when an armament is only prepared on the oppoſite coaſt; the tranſporting

tranſporting that armament is performed in a few hours, and the debarkation executed by a coup de main, when the ſame wind that is fair for that attempt is adverſe and confines our fleets in port; this may be done from Piccardi and Normandy to the coaſt of Suſſex, from Flanders to Kent, and from Holland to Eſſex and Northfolk.

A Foreign Invaſion is by an armament from Spain, or any place the other ſide of Brittany, that muſt be eſcorted by a numerous fleet; ſuch invaſion I conſign over to our navy, that could get out of harbour with the ſame wind, follow them up the Channel, or purſue them if they went to the weſt or north.

I truſt that our fleet will never be employed in the foreign protection of our commerce, the fruits of which commerce is abſorbed in the expence of that fleet—an unprofitable ſyſtem, ſo as to leave our coaſt inſufficiently guarded, and let the enemy ſail triumphant in our narrow ſeas.

The preſent Firſt Lord of the Admiralty, as Earl Spencer, went into office with a character of unſullied integrity, ſimplicity of manners,

manners, eaſy of acceſs in buſineſs, and attention to domeſtic concerns, that has already proved, and will in future ſecure him as a Miniſter above corruption, and to whoſe unremitting care this nation truſts her ſafety: accurſt be the pen of adulation, and doubly ſo that withholds a praiſe from merit.

Was our fleet any ways inferior to our protection, a combination of Spain, Flanders, and Holland, under the direction, and ſupported by the whole power of France, would ſoon reduce this garden of Europe to a deſolate waſte, or rather reduce this nation to a ſtate of ſlavery:—ſo much for my diſtinction between an Home and Foreign Invaſion.

An Home Invaſion.

I NOW advert to its defence: it requires for ſuch a deſperate attempt, an open extenſive coaſt as poſſible, a port or harbour would be very improper for ſuch an undertaking, the crowding of three or four hundred

dred ſail would be attended with confuſion, and the debarkation with loſs of time, a deſtruction of their fleet, and any oppoſition would be fatal to the aſſailants.

Cæſar's ſecond expedition contained eight hundred ſail, William of Normandy nine hundred:—the Spaniſh Armada had the Prince of Parma joined him two thouſand—the coaſt of Suſſex and Kent were the objects of each of theſe fleets. I ſhall make three diviſions of Suſſex and the coaſt of Kent: from Selſey Point to Beachy Head, about forty miles; from Beachy Head to Haſtings, or Dungeneſs, twenty miles; from thence to South Foreland, twenty. I am not exact as to the diſtances, but according to the vulnerable or landing part. The firſt diviſion would take ten thouſand men to line the coaſt according to my calculation, the other, twenty miles each, 5000 men.

I confine my explanation to the Suſſex coaſt from Eaſt Bourn, or Peverſey, to Haſtings. This part I would undertake to defend againſt any number of the invaders with five thouſand men: theſe five thouſand I would divide into twenty diviſions of two

hundred

hundred and fifty each, which would be allotting one diviſion to a mile; on the banks of this mile, pits like ſaw-pits, ſhould be made above high-water mark, ten yards long and three broad, and five feet deep; they ſhould be at the diſtance of one hundred and fifty yards, as the ground would permit. The earth out of theſe pits ſhould be caſt on the land ſide—that would make a breaſt-work; there would be allotted twenty-five men to each pit—twelve in the pit, and the reſt above them behind the breaſt-work; this mode being obſerved the twenty miles, three of theſe diviſions containing ſeventy-five men would play on every boat, in any part, without confuſion; every man, having a reſting-place to fire on, might be conſidered as markſmen.

There would be many places where the enemy could not land; ſuch ſub-diviſions would double behind the other breaſt-works, defended from the artillery of the enemies veſſels, which would have but little effect; theſe two hundred and fifty men ſhould be ſtationary within each mile, either in farm-houſes or hutted; every man would be acquainted

quainted with his own ditch, that on the videts ſounding the alarm at day-break, they would be in an inſtant at their poſts, and the enemy in their firſt career ſtopped. The French, whoſe *primi impetus* is *plus quam virorum*, when ſo ſaluted in their firſt landing, would be ſufficiently ſick of that expedition.

It is a matter of conſideration to know what part of the tide would be moſt favourable for their debarkation—this I take to be of moment: if at full tide, the defendants would immediately charge them, by which they would loſe the protection of their ſhipping to cover their landing; for if the flat-bottomed boats played their guns, it would be on their friends as well as foes, beſides, the tide going out would be apt to leave the gun-boats and other veſſels dry on the ſand, and breed too much confuſion.

I ſhould conceive that an home invaſion, as was the caſe with Cæſar's ſecond invaſion, would wiſh to be on our coaſt at low water; they would then land, and form themſelves, under cover of their great guns, into columns on the ſand, and the flowing tide would bring

 their

their artillery with them, to which any attack upon them would be expoſed, except from the pits and breaſt-works already deſcribed. In reſpect to the diſpoſitions of our armies, it would be preſumptive in me to act the General; only the firſt diſpoſition originating in me, they are at liberty to adopt or reject.

A number of old ſcythes erected on poles, kept in the veſtry-room of each pariſh, would be ready arms for the maſs of the people that did not belong to the militia—they would render great ſervice, and fly to the breaſt-works and ditches I have deſcribed, and impetuouſly charge the enemy already in conflict with the regulars, under a captain of their own chuſing—they would be more deſperate than the militia raiſed in that pariſh, and ſent to a diſtant county.

It has been an undecided controverſy among commanders, which is preferable, to attack an invader on his landing, or to ſuffer him to land, clear the country of cattle and proviſions, and ſtarve him.

The latter opinion in ſome caſes might be admitted in a country where every town is a forti-

fortification, and garriſoned—where an invader would waſte his troops and means in unprofitable ſieges, and where an army muſt ſeek reſources from their own country.

But in England, which is a very garden in reſpect to other parts of the world, rich in agriculture, rich in not only the conveniences but luxuries of life; where the peaſants enjoy their comforts beyond any other ſtate, independent of Ariſtocrats, unoppreſſed by power, forming a part of the conſtitution, and being in a manner the ſupport of it;—in ſuch a country, an enemy, whoſe ſyſtem is plunder and devaſtation, if once allowed a poſition, would ſoon find reſources in the palaces of the great, and the villages they would ſo abundantly find in all parts.

On the other ſide, I am decidedly of opinion, that an enemy ſhould be oppoſed and repulſed on their landing, and that the diſpoſition that I have made on the coaſt of Suſſex and Kent would be competent. An home invaſion, which I have diſtinguiſhed coming from the oppoſite coaſt by a coup-de-main, could attempt to land in no other place.

Was the alarm of foreign danger by Adminiſtration only a ſcreen to conceal their own deeds from the public, I ſhould be the laſt man to countenance ſuch an alarm; but I do not weigh matters from party prejudices, but conviction, ariſing from the exerciſe of my own abilities, convinces me, that had Jourdan and Moreau met at Vienna, and brought the Emperor to their terms, the whole power of Europe would have concentred, under the French influence, to reduce us to their level.

Thoſe powers that the French have fraternized with, are treated by them with the rigour of conqueſt—with England it would be much worſe: their firſt object would be the plunder of London, perhaps the ſacking, as they already declare, *delenda eſt Carthago:* with our fleet given up we ſhould be to France what we were to Rome—a wretched province for four hundred years.

I am free to declare, that, at the commencement of the French troubles, our interference met with my fulleſt approbation, not only on the ſcore of our future ſecurity, as well as the law of talionis, and I have

regretted

regretted that the deſtruction of the fleet and arſenals at Toulon was not more complete; the French incontinently cenſure our conduct on that occaſion, but as a politician and ſoldier, I anſwer them from their own practice, *Dolus an Virtus quis in hoſte requirit.* I muſt and do lament, with every rational man, the intempeſtive zeal of the French, who pretend to diſpenſe and fight for liberty, which at the ſame time they ſo ſcandalouſly wound.

I likewiſe join with Earl Fitzwilliam in reprobating our conceſſions, in ſuing for peace with a people who have no ſtability of government, who acknowledge no Supreme Power to eſtabliſh their faith, nor any earthly power to guarantee their performance; no advantage of ſafety in ſuch a peace, but ſuch as would adminiſter juſt cauſe of jealouſy.—The noble Lord's ſpeech ſpoke as much independence, and breathed as much of the true ſpirit of an Engliſhman, as any ſpeech that ever was uttered in that houſe.—The ſubject has unavoidably led me to the above digreſſions.

It is natural for the thinking mind to conjecture, how the French would act did they gain a poſſeſſion on this iſland; they muſt have artillery, and landing, they could either fortify themſelves, or ſeize on the moment of general panic, or inſtantly march away for London; a battle or two muſt then be fought; the die being caſt, the winner would gain the enterpriſe. The hollow murmur even of danger would feed revolt, and the citizens, whoſe law is lucre, would join the ſtrongeſt. Each man would throw into the ſcale his private portion, that ſoon would mount allegiance, and the general cauſe up to the beam; ſuch would be the caſe if once the enemy approached the city, where there are many perturbent ſpirits, who, at this diſtance from the enemy, uſe daring invectives againſt the preſent government, would be outrageous if the French landed.

If an immediate attack on London would be too arduous, they would ſet fire to the ſhipping in the river, turn their arms to Chatham or Portſmouth; they would fortify Dover to ſecure their retreat, for an enemy muſt

muſt look as much behind as before, and will not leave at his back any place that may offend.—In engineering buſineſs, and fortifications, the French are expert and expeditious.—Dover ſhould be moſt certainly as ſtrongly fortified as nature and art can admit; it would keep the enemy at bay if they landed, of more conſequence againſt an home invaſion than any other point of defence in the kingdom: as to the fortification of Portſmouth, it is not meant as a defence againſt an home invaſion, but as a guard on our naval arſenals and ſhipping, I therefore am a ſtrenuous advocate for fortifying Dover.

All things conſidered, an home invaſion would never make ſuch an attempt unleſs another army landed in the north, and one likewiſe in the Weſt to co-operate with them, of which there is no danger as long as the Emperor finds them employment, and our fleets keep the ſea.

Nego-

Negotiations, Treaties, and Leagues.

THE terms are ſynonimous:—Negotiation is from the Latin, to manage affairs—Treaty is a contract, and means ſimply a ſupplication—League is from the Latin word *Ligare*, ſignifying a pact or covenant—Legation, however, is meant a meſſage.—Treaty of Peace is the concluſion of a war; it likewiſe includes a truce or armiſtice, which is only for a ſhort ſpace of time, when two armies are in the field under a pacific diſpoſition, when both ſides ſecretly think they derive ſome advantage from it; in this buſineſs the maſterſhip of a General conſiſts, either to agree or reſiſt, agreeable to the circumſtance of the time.

The Duke of Brunſwick's retreat from France at the commencement of the war has been cenſured; Clairfait was cenſured laſt campaign for granting a truce to the French army: I have no doubt but thoſe great Generals have ſufficient private reaſons to acquit them.

An

An armiſtice with the French in our naval war would be very impolitic on our ſide; the dominion of the ſeas once gained, can never be loſt, except through negligence or treachery:—let us annihilate their commerce; wealth is only obtained by commerce, and war cannot be carried on without wealth, of which we have given notable proofs this war; the Dutch, having loſt their trade, muſt be living now upon their principle, and muſt ſhortly be reduced to a ſtate of ſlavery, at leaſt not exiſt as a State.

A Treaty or League of Commerce ſucceeds that of Peace; this is founded on mutual benefit of traffic to each power in exchanging the neceſſaries and luxuries of life: Commerce is the daughter of induſtry, and the ſtilax of pleaſure to the enjoyment of happineſs and refinement, which is the conſequence of an intercourſe with the world.

Treaties and Leagues of Alliance, offenſive and defenſive, includes that of peace and commerce, as well as mutual conveniency; they are often grounded on compulſion, as is the caſe of Spain and Holland with France: often on neceſſity and mutual protection to

withſtand an ambitious power, and to bring that power to a proper balance; as in the league between England and the Emperor againſt France; the Emperor could not be expected to maintain the war without ſubſidies and loans from this country, as half his revenues are abſorbed in the fate of Italy and the Netherlands; ſo England, with her powerful fleets, would find ſome difficulty if ſhe could at all maintain a conflict againſt the united forces of Europe without any alliance, although withdrawing her ſubſidies would greatly ſtrengthen her internal reſources.

I think myſelf at liberty to ſay a few words concerning the King of Pruſſia, a relative of our Royal Family, and an old ally of this empire: appearances are much againſt him on ſcore of moral tendency, in not ſupporting the intereſt of a ſiſter and daughter incontinently drove out of Holland; on this appearance, and his quitting the league againſt France, he is become a very unpopular character in this country. Reaſons of State muſt maſter affections; we have proofs of it in the hiſtory of all ages.

When

When Edward the Second's Queen flew to her brother the King of France, he not only refuſed her his aſſiſtance, but refuſed her an aſylum. Even Cæſar's daughter married to Pompey could not reconcile thoſe contending heroes.—The French did not interfere with this country for Charles the Firſt's cauſe, although he had married a daughter of France.

It is a laborious taſk for the moſt enlightened to unravel the myſterious policy of Kings:—it requires an apology from me, living in a manner a recluſe life, loaded with various oppreſſions, totally unconnected with Oppoſition as well as Adminiſtration, to attempt to account for the King of Pruſſia's conduct.

The King of Pruſſia, at the commencement of the war, took a very active part againſt the Regicides of France; he could have no intereſt in that hoſtility but his alliance with England, who muſt have drawn him into that coalition by its ſubſidies, for the King of Pruſſia could not have waſted his revenues in a war that muſt have been fruitleſs to him.

It muſt have been a very impolitic ſyſtem for the King of Pruſſia, inaſmuch as every advantage gained over the French muſt have aggrandized the Emperor, and given him additional weight in the Germanic ſyſtem, of which the King of Pruſſia has been always jealous. Sileſia is a bone of contention, or at leaſt jealouſy, that will always keep thoſe perſons at arms length.

On the whole, I think the King of Pruſſia has acted like a wiſe and politic Prince; who has preſerved peace and ſafety to his own people; preſerved Oſnaburgh to the Duke of York, Hanover to the King of England, and all the north-eaſt part of the Lower Rhine from that devaſtation which the country of the Upper Rhine hath ſo woefully experienced:—ſelf-defence is the firſt principle of politics as well as nature, an attention to which is the beſt proof a prince can give of his wiſdom.

Notwithſtanding I preſume to prognoſticate that the King of Pruſſia will bring about a re-eſtabliſhment, by his means, of the Stadtholder and the drooping plants of Royalty, before the end of this century, who

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can diveſt himſelf of reflection and feeling, when they ſee Kings, the pride of the world, a prey to theſe diſtempered times—melancholy as reverſes of fortune are to private individuals? Philoſophy has a larger exerciſe in the unparallelled fate of the French Princes, in the Murder of the King of Sweden, and poiſoning of other Princes, which ſerves to move our pity rather than envy of ſuch exalted ſituations.

The King of Pruſſia has upheld, on former occaſions, the Orange Family againſt the French intrigues in that government:—his inclination muſt ſtill be the ſame. To arraign his political conduct, ignorant of the ground of his ſyſtem, muſt be unfair: he was blamed by the perturbed ſpirits of this country for taking a ſubſidy, and the ſame unruly ſpirits find fault with him now for not taking it: one thing the Engliſh nation will join in with one voice, that he has ſent a Princeſs, his daughter, to this country, who ſeems to be the pride of her own ſex, and an ornament to human nature.

I muſt obſerve, that a coup-de-main, or home invaſion of the French, will give but

ſhort

ſhort notice; they will appear on the coaſt very early in the morning; in ſuch an appearance, the country will be all confuſion in driving away their cattle, and carrying off the corn and houſehold effects: yet our intelligence muſt be very ignorant, if we have not ſome days notice of troops being embarked, as well as their deſtination. When they approach the land, not a man is to appear on the beach to oppoſe them; but the inſtant they debark out of any boat, the front pit and breaſt-work will fire point blank, and the pits to the right and left fire oblique, ſo that one hundred and fifty men muſt do the execution, and a continual repetition, according to the diſcretion of the officers who command the pits and breaſt-works.—The cavalry I would ſtation in five bodies—one in the extremity of each county, and one at the diſtance of every two miles, on ſome eminences, who could command a view of the enemy, and be ready to charge any body or column that might force their way to the pits. The militia would be competent to do the duty of theſe pits and breaſt-works.

Militia.

Militia.

NEW-EMBODIED MILITIA ſhould at firſt be trained to fire balls, for it comes to my memory, that old regiments at Gibraltar being for a long time uſed on field-days to fire powder only, blinked, and had a tremor on them when they fired ball ſingly at a mark.—I never had any experience in ſerving with the militia, or being in any place where they were embodied; I conceive you would affront them, if you did not look upon them as ſoldiers—nor would they be pleaſed if you conſidered them as mere ſoldiers: I am told they are not ſo pliable as the regulars; moſt undoubtedly they would fight with more enthuſiaſm in their own counties than at a diſtance: it is allowed that no ſoldiers fight better than the French do in France, but that Germany was a Frenchman's grave; was I to command, I would rather truſt to German diſcipline than French enthuſiaſm with equal numbers; and it is ſaid, that the French ſeldom ſucceed againſt the Germans but by a torrent of unequal numbers.—Levies haſtily raiſed,

raiſed, that have never ſeen the face of an enemy, will require time to organize, the fitteſt place for which is garriſon duty. It is to be regretted that there is not a naval militia; two men, or one, conſtantly maintained by every pariſh, and thoſe of every county, employed together in ſome convenient part of the county in rope-yards, in twiſting of ropes for cables, they would, on an emergency, man a fleet with ten thouſand men; a maſt, with rigging, ſhould be erected in the yard, that the men ſhould be acquainted with the ſhrouds, and practiſe going aloft; when any men were ſent to the fleet, the pariſhes ſhould replace them; this plan would not only produce a certain reſource for ſeamen, but a fund to lighten the expence of the pariſhes.—As the navy is certainly the bulwark of this nation, no expence or project ſhould be wanting to complete ſuch an eſtabliſhment.

Lord

Lord Malmſbury.

THE conqueſt of the Cape of Good Hope, and Iſle of Ceylon, was an acquiſition that our Adminiſtration could not have foreſeen or thought of, at the commencement of our war with France; the only fortuitous event that could have happened, that could in any reſpect anſwer as a compenſation for the expence we have been at—an acquiſition of more conſequence to England, than that of Gibraltar could be to Spain, and which, I think, tantamont to our National Debt. On this ground I conſider Adminiſtration's ſincere wiſh to make a peace, independent of the clamour of Oppoſition, and on this ground only, they can meet Earl Fitzwilliam's patriotic ſentiments.

Lord Malmſbury's legation, I will not call it embaſſy, for none was admitted, though applied for through the medium of neutral powers, was no more than a meſſage to the French Directory, to know if they would make a peace; this was certainly a pregnant evidence of acknowledging their govern-

ment. Lord Malmſbury was required to ſay, upon what conditions? anſwer, mutual compenſation: a more explicit ultimatum was demanded—anſwer, we were to keep the Cape of Good Hope, and give up all our other conqueſts to the French, in compenſation for the Netherlands to the Emperor, our ally; this brought on an ultimatum on their ſide as far as a negative could be ſo, with ſome vague ideas of granting to the Emperor territories which were not in their poſſeſſion, or the ſkin of a lion before they killed it: no man could have acted his part in this buſineſs better than Lord Malmſbury, in which he carried himſelf maſterly—the whole tranſaction was cunning, encountering, craft. Miniſtry did well to feel their pulſe, and the reſult is, that each ſide know the ultimatum point of the other: the manner of diſmiſſing Lord Malmſbury is a proof that the Directory found themſelves outwitted, and it was fortunate for his Lordſhip that the poiſſards had not put him into their pickling-tubs.

That England ſhould conſent that the French ſhould keep the Netherlands would be

be impolitic in the extreme; in general this country does not ſeem to be aware of the conſequence. I know that any man in Parliament, or out, who would argue for ſuch an acceſſion to the French, would give ſtrong indication of a bad head, or bad heart.

To give up the Cape of Good Hope would be ſacrificing too much; it will be the ſecurity of the Indies in general, as the Iſle of Ceylon would be to the Carnatic in particular.

The Dutch muſt feel the difference between their former flouriſhing ſtate under the Orange Family, and their preſent decline to utter ruin; under circumſtances that will never allow them to ſwell to any formidable greatneſs, their High Mightineſſes muſt ſtoop to French Egality, and pay all they have for French protection.

It remains now, if the Emperor can maintain the right bank of the Rhine for two years, and ſecure Italy, and that our Miniſter can find ſupplies for another year beſide the preſent, which is provided for.

The Italian powers, very inadequate for their defence ſeparately, collectively, with the

aſſiſtance of the Emperor and the Engliſh fleet, which ſailed triumphant in the Mediterranean, ſent there for their aſſiſtance and protection, might certainly have kept the French from ravaging Italy—ſad change of human actions!—The Romans, celebrated for valour above the human race, ſuffer themſelves to be drove like ſheep.

Neither the Italians or Flemings, unite with France in love and good-will, but fear; that once removed, their hatred will not be diſguiſed. Clemency muſt be affected by thoſe who form a new empire; agreeable to which, the imaginary empire of France exerciſe over their new fraternized conqueſts, their civil commands. There is an affectation likewiſe in what they do command—ſculpture, paintings, and the arts—the very things they have deſtroyed and violated; they deſtroyed their old government under the excuſe of liberty, and now they are deſtroying liberty, by enſlaving their country more than ever it was under monarchy: this is a leſſon to teach us, that ſubjection with ſafety, is better than rebellion with ruin.

Conqueſts

Conqueſts and Colonies.

EVERY conqueſt, that cannot afterwards be made to defend itſelf, muſt be a burden to the captors; for the more places taken, the leſs they will be able to protect. In war there are two cauſes of actions, one immediately to benefit ourſelves, the other to diſtreſs the enemy.—The Weſt-India buſineſs has certainly been a loſing game to us, in which we have ſuffered more in men and money than that branch of commerce can recompenſe; yet it is ſo interwoven with our ſyſtem of commerce, that to throw the iſlands into the lap of France or Spain, would be ſtriking at the root of our national principle.

In emancipating America this empire was no loſer; our revenues are not decreaſed, and we are relieved from heavy charges of fleets, troops, and garriſons: we certainly ſent our manufactures there—in return this country was loaded with their bad debts; it could not be otherwiſe, as credit is the ſpring of commerce: our navigation act curbed their means,

and

and their internal returns not equal to the credit we gave them.

It is not ſo with the Weſt-India iſlands; their produce of ſugars, ſpirits, &c. make ſufficient returns for our manufactures, yet leave the nation in a large arrear for protection.

There is ſome difference between coloniſing and making a conqueſt; a colony has a right to enjoy liberty, and the laws of this country inherently; a conqueſt is at our mercy as conquerors; yet the ſpirit of our Conſtitution is ſuch, that the inſtant they become ſubjects, they enjoy the benefit of our laws, but the conqueror may refuſe them at firſt protection, and extirpate them from the place conquered.

Nova Scotia and Newfoundland are colonies; Canada, Cape Breton, and St. John's Iſland, were conqueſts; all the inhabitants of the latter place were embarked in two veſſels, in order to be ſent to France, but both veſſels periſhed, as it was ſaid, in their paſſage.

Canada is moſt conſiderable at preſent for its trade in furs and agriculture, exporting large

large quantities of wheat to this country, and much more ſo in population, in which France took great delight, repeatedly ſending them ſhip-loads of wives, and allowing portions when they married the ſettlers. It requires a ſtrong garriſon—as it was gained by the ſword, it muſt be kept by the ſword.

Newfoundland, St. John's Iſland, and Cape Breton, are little better than fiſhing ſtations, not tenable: to this country the fiſhing banks are a nurſery for ſeamen, the fiſh chiefly carried up the Mediterranean.—Nova Scotia is a ſtation meant as an emporium for our North-America trade of furs, the harbour not ſo good or convenient as Louiſbourg.—Halifax has a dock where our ſhipping can be repaired and careened. All theſe places depend on our naval protection. Quebec, if that government could depend upon the Canadians, could defend itſelf for ſome time.

Hudſon's Bay is under the monopoly of a company; they are ſuppoſed to go on ſucceſſively, and I do not find they put our government to any expence: their chief trade I take to be fur, whalebone, and oil.

Eaſt-

Eaſt-India.

OUR Eaſt-India trade, as well as poſſeſſions, is beyond any acquiſition ever obtained by any European power: it is become *imperium magnum in imperio parvo;* we can eaſily pay off our national debt by a ſale of the territories, and preſerve the trade.—A ſale of the Carnatic would find purchaſers; Madras, Fort St. George, and other garriſons, could be kept as emporiums for the different branches of commerce locally connected with them; thoſe places to be made impregnable. The purchaſers of the Carnatic, and other territories, would be made guarantees of an incluſive trade to the Engliſh; the Cape of Good Hope would make it excluſive to the reſt of Europe, except through our channel.

I fear, the Eaſt-India Directors, great Nabobs, and little Nabobs, would militate againſt ſuch a reform; the territorial profits at preſent are abſorbed in the immenſe extravagant eſtabliſhment kept up there, that this

this country receive but little profit. By this reform the commercial part would be carried on with encreaſing energy: beſides the ſtate of India ſeems to be in a ſavouriſh ſituation, when the Company's troops are ready to fly in the faces of their maſters. It ſhould not be forgot that the late Lord Clive declared in the Houſe of Commons, that he might have placed himſelf at the head of a greater empire than England—a prediction what might be the caſe with ſome other, and which ought to be guarded againſt by the Company. It would be a melancholy thing, if, when our political war in Europe ſhould ceaſe, a ſocial war ſhould commence in India.

Moreover, our great National Debt demands ſome ſacrifice, which would be more prudent in Aſia, than to be made in Great Britain: if I can foreſee, the ſequel muſt wofully happen—the ſmart of the war is too ſeverely felt, for me to encreaſe it by unfavourable repreſentations.

Peace.

THERE are no opinions floating upon this ſubject, but what ariſe from men's fears or intereſts—how to collect them is the difficulty? The moſt public, could they be depended upon, are, *ex actis verbis diurnis*, on which antient hiſtorigraphers relied; but in theſe times newſpapers are ſo inventive, and ſo contradictory through which they are communicated, that it would be an inſult on common underſtanding to uſe ſuch an impoſition. Another method, *actis ſenatus*, were they the acts of an independent Parliament, and not of the Miniſter, there would be no difficulty in recommending them, though they do bind the ſubject.—The Philoſopher, whoſe creed is truth, rejects the information; and I, for one, humbly offer my ideas to the public, and rely on their judgment.

Every overture for peace, after Lord Malmſbury's reception, from this country with France, muſt wear a very humiliating aſpect; and any future treaty of accord muſt be

be the effect of puſillanimity on our part, or great inequality on their ſide, before matters can be accommodated.

An awe of Majeſty, which has been ſo trampled upon in France, is ſo connected with the tyranny of prieſtcraft that propped it up, as to make ſuch a reſtoration hardly practicable; the taſte of wickedneſs is not ſo eaſily loſt, nor the habit of obedience ſo eaſily recovered.

The preſent rulers in France muſt dread a peace more than war; three hundred thouſand men in arms, who have been accuſtomed to ſubſiſt on pillage in other countries, will not ſtarve in their own. As at firſt the regicides had no further view than to eſtabliſh themſelves, their ſucceſs in a full tide of overflowing all oppoſition has been ſuch, that neceſſity alone can now bridle them in an extremity of internal diſtreſs.

I cannot ſee any probability of a peace without a reſtitution of Brabant to the Emperor. It is difficult to form any ſettled judgment in uncertainties; I conceive, however, that the Italian States uniting, and joined to the Emperor's forces, to keep the

French within their own territories, and the King of Pruſſia advancing againſt Duſſeldorf, and ſecuring the right bank of the Lower Rhine, would do the buſineſs effectually.

Had the Emperor's troops taken up their winter-quarters in Alſace, or Treves, I ſhould not have the leaſt doubt but the Archduke's object would have been Paris, ſoon after the opening of the campaign; and it remains to ſee if he takes an offenſive part. Straſburgh being taken, he will not be above a week's march from the Iſle of France: the very attempt, which might be made without danger, would make the French evacuate Italy and withdraw all their troops from Holland and Brabant, and cure them from Britiſh invaſions. The Rhine would then be open for ſupplies from this country to all the German garriſons; the Emperor and England would have peace likewiſe on their own terms.

I muſt dwell ſomewhat on the advantages that this country would benefit more than any other country in Europe by a peace; independent of the acquiſition made, the Engliſh, by engroſſing the whole trade of the eaſt,

eaſt, weſt, and the north, have fixed the ſtaples of commerce in ſuch a channel, that it muſt be the work of time to alter its courſe; the benefit of which will be more in the conſequence than preſent appearances.

There is a ſingular navigation of trade in this country internal, not ſufficiently underſtood, which is the traffic carrying on within our own bowels, by means of the Duke of Bridgewater's canals and landed navigations, which keeps the manufactures all in full employment. It has been ſaid, that the man who makes a blade of graſs grow where none grew before, deſerves a ſtatue—if ſo, the Duke of Bridgewater's deſerts are unmeaſurable: one of the firſt Dukes of the realm, abſtracting himſelf from the enjoyments attached to his high ſituation, undertakes, ſingly, one of the greateſt works ever attempted by a ſubject in any country, in any age, at the hazard of expending his whole property; and, by a wonderful perſeverance and reſolution, ſucceeds in it!—What muſt have been his anxiety for ſo many years? what muſt his ſatisfaction be now to ſee it compleated? to reflect that,

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by his means, thouſands get their livelihood by honeſt induſtry, and that he has done more for the welfare of his country than any man ever born in it?

The advantages of peace would be felt by every individual from the higheſt to the loweſt; and yet war, that ſhould be carried on only to procure peace, is often conducted by Miniſters, from wicked policies, to ſtrengthen their influence—by a profuſion which patronage and a full treaſury obtains for them. However, I do not conſider the preſent conteſt with France altogether on ſuch motives; ſuch a contradiction in the principles of their government and ours cannot eaſily be reconciled: Lord Bacon obſerves, that an unity that is pieced up by a direct admiſſion of contrarieties in the fundamental points of it, is like the toes of Nebuck'd Inazor's image, which was made up of iron and clay, they may cleave together but never incorporate; ſo in reſpect to a dependance on France, whoſe fundamental principle is foreign to us, we have nothing left but—*virem vi opponere, virtutem dolo.*

In

In this troubled, unſettled ſtate of the world, innovations will find many partizans: ambition among the great; curioſity, novelty, among the middle ſort; and hopes of plunder in the lower claſs, will always give rebellion a ſpur.

The common blind for rebellion is reformation. I confeſs I ſee room for reformation ſufficiently in ſeveral branches of Adminiſtration, yet I ſhould be ſorry to ſee it brought about by a revolution, as the remedy would be worſe than the diſeaſe: and, on the whole, I apply that adage, that it is better to bear thoſe ills we have, than thoſe we know not of.

The firſt attention of the French when they landed, would be by emiſſaries to taint our troops with their contagious infection. The ſpirit of enthuſiaſm works unaccountably in the human mind; during the reign of Lewis Fourteenth of France, the ſpirit of that nation enthuſiaſtically moved in one ſpring the glory and honour of their grand Monarch; the pride of which made even the peaſant ſtrut in his wooden ſhoes: and now, ſad reverſe, as Hannibal ſwore on the

Altar

Altar eternal hatred to the Romans, ſo every Frenchman now does the ſame to Kings, and, I believe, to this country.

If any benefit can ariſe from a war to this country, it muſt be, as I have read, its reſemblance to our plantations; inſomuch as it ſerves as a broom to ſweep the kingdom, rather than an enterpriſe to adorn it; in carrying off ruffians, and goal birds, the ſcum of the nation.

Next to the war, the finances of this kingdom requires the greateſt conſideration, and moſt ſerious inveſtigation. I have, in a former publication, pointed out an eccleſiaſtic reformation, by which the nation would benefit to the amount of ſixty millions, without doing any injuſtice to any individual; and in part of this work I recommend a ſale of the Carnatic and Aſiatic territories.

It is not ſufficient to find a way to pay off the National Debt, as to ſcrutinize the cauſe, unravel the myſterious policy, and prevent in future ſuch an encreaſing evil. I ſhall be ſtudious to prepare materials to enable me to do juſtice to the ſubject, when this raging madneſs of war is over.

How

How clouded is the proſpect, when every thing threatens a wild diſorder; no provident foreſight can mark the concluſion, which ſteals on like a canker into the heart's core: it will even attack the rules of juſtice, and laws integrity—the phyſician comes too late, when the Conſtitution's gone.

And yet this country has been in worſe condition. I forget whoſe reign, an Act once paſſed, that every perſon throughout the kingdom ſhould faſt one day in the week, and pay the expence that would have otherwiſe incurred to the exigencies of the ſtate: it would be no difficult matter to faſt; but to enforce a willing payment would be but as a drop of water to the ocean of our great occaſions.

The neceſſity of the war would warrant the mode of taxing, though grievous and intolerable, to be in ſome ſhape excuſable, but the great difficulty would be to get the money; and how to procure it, for the general diſtreſs is ſuch, that people of the firſt credit and condition feel the extremity of want.

I lately knew two friends in affluence, who had no ſuſpicion that the other was any way

ſtraitened in pecuniary matters, ſend to each other in the ſame moment of time, their ſervants meeting with each a letter to the other's maſter, making mutual applications to each other, and, to the aſtoniſhment of both, each diſappointed: in ſuch ſituation, there is a general proſcription to every impulſe of humanity.

Every day teems with freſh diſaſters, ſome real, and others invented: in this ſeaſon of the year it is not to be wondered at, nor to be guarded againſt.

The chief attention in this kingdom ſhould have two general points: the firſt, that every man ſhould contribute and ſuffer for the general good; the next, that what is contributed ſhould be properly laid out.

Misfortunes ſhould not ſhake the fortitude of any man. A diamond that falls into the mire does not loſe its luſtre or value. If a man has merit, he ſhould be happy that he is in a ſituation to put his pretended friends to the teſt. All men affect qualities they have not; when thoſe qualities are affected, they are only blinds to ſome deep ſiniſter motives.

I will

I will again advert to the Germanic ſyſtem—if I miſtake not, it originated in a religious union againſt the papal power, and the Bourbon family. The principle being totally removed by the Regicides of France, has diſſolved the Diet, and leaves each State at liberty to purſue its own intereſt, or it requires a new Diet to organize the different ſtates to a new ſyſtem.

Moſt probably the Rhine will be the future boundary between France and Germany. The diviſion of Poland having taken place; the Emperor having loſt Italy and Brabant, leaves a moſt powerful rival in the King of Pruſſia to diſpute the precedency between Berlin and Vienna. This, I preſume, will be the caſe, if the French force the Emperor to accept a peace with the loſs of Italy and Brabant.

If the Emperor concludes a ſeparate peace, which the French are ſo anxiouſly meditating, it then will remain how we are to defend ourſelves?

In defending our home dominions, Great Britain and Ireland, we are thoroughly competent; our expences on our home fleet and

internal forces, being laid out among ourſelves, will not impoveriſh the nation.

The Cape of Good Hope and Iſle of Ceylon being in our poſſeſſion, comes within the Company's eſtabliſhment. Ten ſail of the line at the Cape would ſufficiently ſecure the Eaſt againſt any fleet ſent from Europe of double the number, foul and ſhattered, with a three month's voyage. The Company's trade in the Eaſt alone would be ſufficient for its protection, without encumbering our finances. A ſwift-ſailing frigate at St. Helen's, from which to the Cape is five hundred leagues, would give timely notice to the Cape of the approach of any enemy. Having thus diſpoſed of the Eaſt, the attention of Adminiſtration would be but little moleſted from thence.

Gibraltar is the next object of our conſideration: I do not overſhoot the mark when I ſay, the fee ſimple of that place has coſt this nation fifty millions: the balance of which, on the contra ſide, muſt be imaginary, more in its political conſequence, than the protection it gives to our Levant trade.

This

This is matter of opinion; a point often controverted in Parliament. Four regiments in time of peace, and eight in war, is the accuſtomary eſtabliſhment, beſides the Staff—Store proviſion in peace, occaſionally ſent from this country; in time of war once in the year, eſcorted by a fleet. Though the rock itſelf being impregnable, it muſt depend upon our fleet to prevent a blockade, by which it only can be taken. This fort, however, will be no additional drawback on our finances, or national defence.

I have already touched on our ſettlements in North America; the objects there for the enemy to diſturb the fiſhery, is no great ſubject for them to draw a great fleet from this country for its protection. If they ſhould attempt with a fleet to take Quebec, I pronounce that fleet would never return to France.

I now come to that great, important, and, I may ſay, vulnerable point of external attack, which would be the object of France and Spain—the Weſtern Iſlands, and Jamaica in particular; more dreadful in the climate, than attack of the enemy, would be

the

the principal drain of our finances, men, and ſhipping; were the French diſengaged from a continental war, twenty-five ſail of the line, and twenty-five thouſand regular troops, would at leaſt be required for the Weſt-Indies from England, and their dependance for ſtores and proviſions muſt chiefly be upon America, or otherwiſe greatly diſtreſs this country.

In ſuch a ſituation, our actions muſt be that of defence.—Ten ſail of the line in the Eaſt, twenty-five in the Weſt Indies, and five at Nova Scotia and the fiſhing banks.—There would remain of our navy one hundred ſail for the protection of England and Ireland; twenty ſail off Breſt; twenty at Liſbon for the Spaniſh coaſt; and ten on the Dutch coaſt: this would keep fifty ſail out at ſea, the other fifty in port ready to relieve them, and ſo alternately: the ſmaller ſhips of war cruizing about the Channel.

To depend ſolely on Cork and Ireland for proviſion for the fleet would be an unfortunate circumſtance. There certainly is in North Wales great ſtore of cattle, in the Iſle of Angleſea in particular, and no place better calculated

calculated for ſlaughtering than Carnarvon Caſtle. I recommended, many years ago, ſuch a plan to the Earl of Sandwich, when he was Firſt Lord of the Admiralty, and have often been ſurpriſed it has not been put into execution.

I formerly gave ten pounds for ſurveying the bar of Carnarvon; by the report, veſſels of burden, at ſmall expence, would with ſafety ſail into the harbour of Carnarvon.

It is not from Miniſters, it is not from Oppoſition, that the true *amor patriæ* is to be learnt, but from reflexion and the emanations of an honeſt heart, and reſolution to do juſtice, in ſuch language as to be underſtood by the ſimple, and not diſgraceful to the wiſe.

I leave to Mr. Burke and others the affectation of ſtyle, and in diſplaying an image of their own wit, more than the truth of hiſtory; which, in a common phraſe, is making Fame their goddeſs, and writing love-letters to poſterity:—my intention is to offer information—what has merit may be improved upon—what has none, may be laid aſide.

FINIS.

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